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But the importance of price stability has some-
times been insufficiently appreciated in our
central bank’s history, and, as Allan Meltzer will
soon point out, such episodes have had unfortu-
nate consequences. 
Far from being a bulwark of stability in the
1970s, the Federal Reserve conducted policies
that, in the judgment of many analysts, inadver-
tently contributed to an environment of macro-
economic instability. We should strive to retain
in the collective memory of our institution the
ensuing lessons of that period. It may be the most
fruitful and proper way to commemorate the
events of October a quarter-century ago. 
Tracing the roots of the 1970s inflation brings
us to an earlier era. The Keynesian revolution of
the 1930s and its subsequent empirical applica-
tion led many economists to accept the view that
through regulation, state intervention, and the
macroeconomic management of aggregate demand,
government policies (including those of our
nation’s central bank) could improve on earlier
efforts to achieve and maintain “full employment.”
By the 1960s, policymakers seemed to concentrate
their short-run objectives on maintaining a “high
pressure” economy, in the belief that such a recipe
could virtually thwart economic contractions at
little or no risk to long-run stability and growth.
If this high-pressure management inadvertently
carried the economy beyond its productive poten-
tial, some costs in terms of inflation could be
expected, but such costs appeared tolerable in
light of the employment gains that came with
them. Furthermore, policymakers hoped that addi-
tional tools at their disposal—so-called incomes
policies enforced by “jawboning,” guideposts, and
price and wage controls—were ready to combat
A
defining moment may shape the
direction of an institution for decades
to come. In the modern history of the
Federal Reserve, the action it took on
October 6, 1979, stands out as such a milestone
and arguably as a turning point in our nation’s
economic history. The policy change initiated
under the leadership of Chairman Paul Volcker
on that Saturday morning in Washington rescued
our nation’s economy from a dangerous path of
ever-escalating inflation and instability. As I
noted in congressional testimony before the
Joint Economic Committee on November 5 of
that year,
We are here…to evaluate the moves of
Chairman Volcker and his colleagues last
month, implying that some alternate poli-
cies were feasible at that time. However,
given the state of the world financial mar-
kets, had the Fed not opted to initiate a
sharp interest rate increase in this country,
the market would have done it for us.1
In a democratic society such as ours, the
central bank is entrusted by the Congress, and
ultimately by the citizenry, with the tremendous
responsibility of guarding the purchasing power
of money. It is now generally recognized that price
stability is a prerequisite for the efficient alloca-
tion of resources in our economy and, indeed,
for fulfilling our ultimate mandate to promote
maximum sustainable employment over time.
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© 2005, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.and control any resulting upcreep in inflation,
with minimal macroeconomic cost. By the turn of
the 1970s, the ugly reality of stagflation forced an
overhaul of this policy framework. The corrosive
influence of inflation on our nation’s productive
potential was beginning to take hold. Policymakers
slowly came to recognize the adverse long-term
consequences of compromising the purchasing
power of our currency for economic well-being.
Indeed, by the late 1970s, a consensus gradually
emerged that inflation destroyed jobs rather than
facilitated their creation. Unfortunately, a legacy
of failed attempts during the decade, to restore
stability with gradualist plans and with various
incarnations of incomes policies, took its toll on
business and household attitudes toward infla-
tion and toward the prospects of our nation. By
the end of the decade, an inflationary psychology
had become well entrenched and complicated
efforts to restore a sense of stability in the national
psyche. 
Little leeway for policy was left before the
Federal Reserve took decisive action on October 6,
1979. In retrospect, the policy put in place on
that day was the obvious and necessary solution
to the nation’s troubles. As events unfolded, how-
ever, the Federal Reserve did not escape criticism,
and for a time it was not entirely obvious that
the System could maintain the necessary public
support to see its disinflationary efforts come to
fruition. Though widely anticipated even before
the actions of October, the recession and retrench-
ment in employment that followed those actions
resulted in pressures on the Federal Reserve to
reverse course. The 50th anniversary of the begin-
ning of the Great Depression—the crash of 1929—
was observed later during that same month,
October 1979. I recall that this anniversary not
only rekindled the question of whether such an
event could recur but also inflamed sensitivities
regarding the effects on unemployment that might
stem from the new anti-inflationary action. Judg-
ing from the fate of earlier attempts during the
1970s to tame inflation in the face of a weakening
economy, when short-run considerations appeared
to trump policies oriented toward longer horizons,
such fears of rising unemployment could have
also derailed the reforms of October. In the event,
they did not. We owe a tremendous debt of grati-
tude to Chairman Volcker and to the Federal
Open Market Committee for their leadership and
steadfastness on that important occasion and for
restoring the public’s faith in our nation’s currency.
By the time that I arrived at the Federal
Reserve, in 1987, the task of the Federal Open
Market Committee had become easier precisely
because of the perseverance and success of our
predecessors in the turbulent years following
October 1979. Maintaining an environment of
stability is simpler than restoring the public’s
faith in the soundness of our currency. The task
is easier still as we remind ourselves of the stark
difference between the long-term prospects of
our economy now, in our current environment of
stability, and then, a quarter-century ago, before
the reforms of that October.
In closing, I applaud President Poole and his
colleagues for organizing this event to reflect on
that critical episode in our nation’s economic
history. An appreciation of our history is, after
all, an invaluable guide to sound policies for a
better future. 
Greenspan
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